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FOREWORD: THE LAW OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
AND THE LESSONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
STEPHEN B. BURBANK t
S. JAY PLAGERJ
The papers that follow reflect work that their authors performed
as consultants for the National Commission on Judicial Discipline
and Removal (the "Commission"). The Commission was created by
statute in late 1990,1 and it submitted its report on August 2,
1993.2 We were privileged to serve as members, and one of us as
vice-chair, of the Commission.
This Foreword provides a welcome opportunity to discuss the
work of the Commission, including the relationship between the
research that was performed under its auspices and the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations in its report. That report has
much to offer policymakers concerned about the specific problems

t Robert G. Fuller, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Member,
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal.
$ Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Vice-Chair,
National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal.
1 See National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Act, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 408, 104 Stat. 5089, 5124 (1990).
2 See NATIONAL COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL (1993) [hereinafter
REPORT].
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of federal judicial discipline. In addition, some of the research
conducted for the Commission has implications for questions unrelated to that field. Finally, the Commission's modes and methods
of work may shed light on questions regarding the use of social
science research in public policy decision-making.
I. THE ORIGINS AND STATUTORY MANDATE OF THE COMMISSION
Until 1980, the law of federal judicial discipline was to a great
extent the law of impeachment. 3 In the absence of any impeachment since 1936, 4 it was not unreasonable to ask whether the only
constitutionally prescribed process for imposing discipline on
Article III judges was adequate to serve the needs of a nation, and
of ajudiciary, quite different from that contemplated by the framers
and ratifiers of the Constitution. Impeachment was not, of course,
the only source of restraint against abuse of federal judges'
constitutionally guaranteed independence. Yet, the other major
formal legal restraint-the criminal law-had rarely been invoked
against a federal judge. 5 Moreover, although the effectiveness of
informal processes was often cited in response to critics of federal
judicial discipline, the successes of those processes remained largely
anonymous, while the failures remained on the bench. 6
Politicians have been concerned about the difficulty of removing
federal judges at least since Thomas Jefferson's failed attempt to
make an example of Justice Chase. 7 Proposals to make removal
easier, substantively and procedurally, whether by constitutional
amendment or statute, are common throughout our history. They
tend to cluster in periods of general institutional tension or specific
experience with the impeachment process or its alternatives.8 In
the 1970s, the nation was chastened by the lessons of Watergate,
one of which, dramatically highlighted, was the extraordinary

34 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-3.

judge Halsted Ritter of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida was impeached and removed from office in 1936. See id. at 30.
5 See id. at 2, 72-73 (stating that before 1980 no federal judge was convicted of a
crime committed while in office).
6 See id. at 2-3; Stephen B. Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking under the Judicial
CouncilsReform andJudicialConduct and DisabilityAct of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283,
291-92, 305 (1982).
7 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 42-113 (1992).
8 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 31-32; Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career

Resolution: An Essay on the Removal of FederalJudges,76 Ky. LJ. 643, 645.46 (1988).
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demands of the impeachment process. 9 In addition, Congress was
the ability
not unaware of the occasionally expressed doubts about
10
order.
in
house
own
its
keep
to
judiciary
of the federal
The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 198011 (the "1980 Act") was designed to help the
judiciary deal fairly with problems of misconduct and disability not
requiring the awesome power of impeachment, and to help
Congress when proceedings under the Act revealed a need for the
exercise of that power. The careful deliberations leading up to that
compromise legislation had persuaded Congress that, particularly
as the federal judiciary continued to grow, the traditional processes,
essentially informal, for maintaining discipline within the judiciary
would benefit from an explicit grant of formal authority to deal with
cases of misconduct and disability. Congress reserved the ultimate
12
power of removal for the few cases warranting that action.
Such cases were not long in coming; the decade of the 1980s saw
the federal prosecution of three Article III judges for offenses
allegedly committed while in office, the first such prosecutions in
our history. 13 Unfortunately, these cases also established another
first (and second): a federal judge's refusal to resign after conviction and unsuccessful appeal. 14 Public outrage at the spectacle of
a convicted and imprisoned federal judge continuing to draw salary
and benefits was probably sufficient to prompt Congress to invoke
15
the heavy artillery of impeachment.
The experience was sobering. The mechanisms for assistance by
the judiciary, established by the 1980 Act, were, if not formally
irrelevant, then relevantly a formality. 16 Further, the House of
9 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, 30-31; Burbank, supra note 8, at 677-78.
10 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 305.

1 Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988 & Supp.

IV 1992)).

12 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4; Burbank, supra note 6, at 291-308.

13 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 73-74. The three werejudge Alcee Hastings of the
U.S. States District Court for the Southern District of FloridaJudge Harry Claiborne
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, andJudge Walter Nixon of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
14 See id. judges Claiborne and Nixon refused to resign. More recently, judge
Robert Collins of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana did
resign after his conviction on three counts of bribery, conspiracy, and obstruction of
justice was affirmed on appeal. The judicial Conference had also certified to the
House of Representatives its determination that consideration of impeachment might
be warranted. See id. at 74.
15 See id. at i, 5, 7.
16 See id. at 4.
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Representatives had no general rules for impeachment inquiries,
and its precedents, hoary with age, did not cover a situation in
17
which a federal officer had previously been convicted of a crime.
The Senate had general rules, but they were hoarier still, 18 and the
situation of a prior conviction was deemed to be fraught with both
constitutional significance and, as senators anticipated the future,
considerable precedential risk. 19
If the burdens of removing a previously convicted federal judge
seemed onerous, the burdens attending the impeachment and
removal ofJudge Alcee Hastings, who had been acquitted by ajury,
were excruciating. Here, the 1980 Act was helpful, indeed probably
essential, to the impeachment process, since it was action taken by
a judicial council under the Act that precipitated the impeachment. 20
But the proceedings in the House and Senate were
protracted and, given the prior acquittal and charges of racism,
highly charged. 2 1
And so it was that concerns about the difficulty of removing
federal judges once again prompted calls for reform. And again,
some of the reform proposals took the form of constitutional
amendments, while others were couched in statutory form. Many
of the proposals were addressed only to the most serious perceived
problems of the recent impeachments, arising in cases involving a
prior felony conviction. However, a few of the proposals either
suggested a broader agenda by covering all of federal judicial
discipline or explicitly avowed such an agenda by disparaging the
22
judiciary's efforts at self-regulation under the 1980 Act.
One of the proposals concerning reform of the impeachment
process did not advance a solution but rather called for a comprehensive study. Originally suggested by Senator Robert Dole in
response to the Claiborne impeachment trial, the idea was adopted,
expanded and refined by Congressman Robert Kastenmeier in his
capacity as chair of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee. 23 The lead author of the 1980 Act, Congressman Kastenmeier
17 See id. at 38-39; Burbank, supra note 8, at 677-79.

18 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 49-50; Burbank, supra note 8, at 685.
19 See Burbank, supra note 8, at 691 n.232.
20 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
21 See id. at i, 73, 78.
22 See id. app. I; Burbank, supra note 8, at 644-45, 660.
23 See Burbank, supra note 8, at 699-700; Stephen B. Burbank, Is it Time for a
National Commission on JudicialIndependence and Accountability?, 73 JUDICATURE 176,
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ensured that Congress kept its promise of vigorous oversight of the

implementation of that legislation. 24 Such oversight was instrumental in reform by the judiciary of the rules promulgated to
govern proceedings under the Act, and led to statutory amendments
in 198825 and 1990.26 The 1990 legislation also included a subtitie establishing the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and
Removal. 27

As provided in its authorizing legislation, the Commission
consisted of three members appointed by the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate, three by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, three by the Chief Justice, three by the President,
and one by the Conference of Chief Justices of the States of the
United States. 28 Its duties were:
(1) to investigate and study the problems and issues involved
in the tenure (including discipline and removal) of an article III
judge;
(2) to evaluate the advisability of proposing alternatives to
current arrangements with respect to such problems and issues,
including alternatives for discipline or removal of judges that
would require amendment to the Constitution; and

227 (1990) ("applaud[ing] Title II of H.R. 1620, which contemplates ... the sort of
broad-ranging contextual study by a national commission that [the author has]
proposed").
24 See 126 Cong. Rec. 28,612 (1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 28,093
(statement of Sen. DeConcini).
25 See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 403(c),
102 Stat. 4642, 4651 (1988).
26
SeeJudidal Discipline and Removal Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 402, 104 Stat. 5122, 5122-23.
27 See supra text accompanying note 1.
28 SeeJudicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 411, 104 Stat.
5089, 5125.
Commission members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
were: Sen. Howell T. Heflin of Alabama, Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, and
Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives: Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New York, former Rep.
Robert W. Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, and Stephen B. Burbank, Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania; by the President of the United States: CharlesJ. Cooper,
Esq., Deputy Assistant Attorney GeneralJohn C. Harrison, succeeded by Beth Nolan,
Associate Counsel to the President, and Stephen L. Carter, Professor of Law, Yale
University; by the Chief Justice of the United States: Circuit Judge S. Jay Plager,
Senior CircuitJudge Levin H. Campbell, and Roger C. Cramton, Professor of Law,
Cornell University; by the Conference of ChiefJustices: ChiefJustice Gordon R. Hall
of Utah. See REPORT, ,supra note 2.
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(3) to prepare and submit to the Congress, the Chief Justice
of the United States, and the President a report .... 29
Originally required to submit its report containing findings,
conclusions, and recommendations not later than one year after the
date of its first meeting, 30 the Commission received additional
funding,3 1 and an extension 3 2 that permitted it to submit its final
report on August 2, 1993.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S RESEARCH PROGRAM

The first official meeting of the Commission, held at the end of
January 1992, 1 was a two-day retreat away from offices and, within
reason, telephones. The purpose was to canvass, for the benefit of
all commissioners, the world ofjudicial discipline and removal, and
to define preliminarily the broad subjects that should be addressed.
Members of the Commission reported on the different possible
topics. The second day concluded with a discussion of information
needs and potential research projects revealed by the canvass, upon
which future recommendations could be based.
The Commission benefitted enormously from having members
knowledgeable in each of the areas of major concern.
Two
commissioners were intimately familiar with the workings of the
1980 Act (one was chair of the Judicial Conference committee
administering the Act); others had served or were serving in
Congress and had first-hand experience with the impeachment
process; still others had held senior positions in the executive
branch, including the Justice Department. One commissioner was
personally knowledgeable about the disciplinary systems of the
states. The chair of the Commission was a former House member
who for some years had chaired the House Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice.
29

Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, § 410, 104 Stat. at 5124-25.

30 See id. § 415, 104 Stat. at 5127.

31 See Act of Oct. 6, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-395, tit. I1, 106 Stat. 1828, 1858.
32 See Act of Sept. 23, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-368, tit. I, 106 Stat. 1117, 1118.
33 Although the Act creating the Commission was approved on December 1,1990,
the members of the Commission were not all appointed until the fall of 1991. There
was then a period of delay caused by the fact that the statute left to the Commission
the selection of the chair from among its membership, but did not provide any
mechanism for calling an initial meeting of the group to organize itself and select the
chair. The problem was solved when the two judge members convened an
organizational caucus in December 1991, at which time the chair (Robert
Kastenmeier) and vice-chair (Judge S. Jay Plager) were elected.
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Although only two of the thirteen commissioners were members of
the federal judiciary, they actively sought to ensure that the
concerns of the judiciary, as an institution, were kept before the
Commission. Finally, each of the federal appointing authorities had
included a distinguished academic lawyer as one of its three
appointees, and the vice-chair, now a judge, had been a law
34
professor and law school dean.
This first meeting was followed by an all-day meeting late in
March of 1992 at which the heads of organizations with expertise in
various related subject matter areas discussed the work of their
organizations.3 5 A substantial portion of the remainder of the
second meeting was devoted to a discussion of the Commission's
research program, this time focused by a five-page outline designated "Information Needs and Research Projects." 36 The outline had
been prepared by the staff under the direction of what by this time
had become the Commission's research working group, those
commissioners with particular research experience and interests
who volunteered to take an active role in this aspect of the
Commission's work. This meeting also began the process of
identifying and selecting the consultants who would conduct the
Commission's research.
In addition to the regular meetings of the Commission, the
research working group met separately several times. 37 These
meetings proved very valuable. The first was held in June 1992,
shortly after the Commission had agreed upon the initial group of
consultants to be employed to undertake the research program.
The Commission's working group invited the consultants to attend
a full day of discussions. This permitted the consultants to learn
about the scope of each other's planned work, and gave the
commissioners and the consultants an opportunity to ensure that
there was a clear understanding about what was expected, and the
time frame for completion of the work.
34 For biographies of Commission members, see REPORT, supra note 2, at 191-96.
3' The participants included the StateJustice Institute (David Tevelin, Executive

Director), the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Federaljudicial Responsibility
(Prof. A. Leo Levin, Chair), and the American Judicature Society (Dr. Frances
Zemans, Executive Director).
36 See Memorandum from Michael J. Remington to Members of the National
Commission on judicial Discipline and Removal (Mar. 17,1992) (on file with authors).
37 It was the policy of the Commission to invite all commissioners to all meetings,
including those of the research working group.
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Between meetings, the Commission members of the research
working group were available to provide informal consultation with
8
consultants and staff regarding the research program.3
Later in
the course of the Commission's work, the research group met to
review the progress of the various studies, and to resolve questions
arising out of the inevitable overlaps and gaps that emerged. As a
result, the Commission identified and engaged additional consul39
tants, including several law firms who assisted pro bono.
The Commission's early identification of issues and topics,
reflected in the "Information Needs and Research Projects"
outline, 40 proved to be both comprehensive and insightful.
Revised but once following the first public hearing in May 1992, the
outline became the guiding document for the Commission's one
and a half years of work. The outline not only served to identify the
topics to be included in the report, but it identified the questions
for which the Commission needed answers-answers that were not
necessarily available in the extant literature.
For example, a fundamental question regarding the judiciary's
self-regulation under the 1980 Act was how the current system
operated. To answer this, the Commission needed to know:
(1) who are the complainants? (2) who are the complained-about
judges? (3) what is the nature of the complaints? (4) how many
problem cases are there? and (5) could empirical trends and
regional differences be identified? Obviously, answers to these
questions would not be found in the statutes or in the literature that
focused on the history and scope of the statutory plan. 4 1 These
data, it was hoped, could then be used to answer normative
questions such as: (1) how well does the system operate? (2) can the
system be improved? and (3) do current data collection methodologies and reporting procedures adequately serve the needs of
policymakers?
The outline also reflected early recognition of the role and
importance of less formal processes for constraining undesirable
judicial conduct.
Included were questions regarding judicial
socialization, the exercise of peer pressure, enforcement of the
38 In addition to the consultants, the Commission was assisted by a small, full-time

staff, headed by Director Michael J. Remington and Deputy Director William J.
Weller.
39 For biographies of Commission consultants and a full list of those providing
assistance, see REPORT, supra note 2, at 198-210.

40 See supra text accompanying note 36.
41 See Burbank, supra note 8, at 660-61.
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Canons of Ethics, and judicial willingness to submit to the hierarchy
of appellate court supervision. Answers to these questions would
require opinion research, and the outline specifically called for
determining the views of the circuit chief judges who play a pivotal
role in administering the system.
The Commission's interest in empirical studies was not limited
to the administration of the 1980 Act. On the contrary, similar
questions were asked, and empirical research methodologies
designed and pursued, for each of the other major areas of inquiry:
the separate roles of the House of Representatives and the Senate
in impeachment proceedings, and the responses of the congressional leadership to the demands the Constitution places upon them;
and the role and behavior of the executive branch in its prosecutorial function, its interaction with the Congress in impeachment
activities, and in the link between the appointment and disciplinary
processes. The work product of these studies is publicly available
42
in two volumes of Commission research papers.
In addition to recognizing the importance of empirically based
data, the Commission recognized the need to have answers to an
array of legal questions. These issues ranged from the details of the
statutorily provided benefits package of federal judges and the
relevant Canons of Judicial Ethics, to the statutes and rules
governing the processes of discipline (by the judiciary) and removal
(by the Congress). Running through many of these, and defining
the parameters of all, were the understandings of the governing
constitutional provisions.
The Commission's early discussions revealed the pervasiveness
of the constitutional issues. The choice was between having the
consultants for each discrete topic area address a subset of the
relevant constitutional questions, or consolidating the most
important of these questions into one comprehensive study by a
single consultant, to which the Commission and the other consultants could refer as needed. The decision was made to pursue the
latter course, although one exception to that decision emerged.
While the Commission's work was in progress, the Supreme Court
granted review in the case of Nixon v. United States.43 In this case
a recently impeached and removed judge challenged the Senate's
42

See RESEARCH PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE

AND REMoVAL (1993) [hereinafter RESEARCH PAPERS].

43 112 S. Ct. 1158 (1992), grantingcert. to Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
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use of a committee of senators, under Senate Rule XI, to take
evidence in his impeachment trial.
Given the prospect of a
Supreme Court decision of this issue, the Commission determined
to omit it from the scope of the constitutional-issues study, and
arranged to have the case monitored by a separate consultant.
III. THE ROLE OF LEGAL RESEARCH IN
THE COMMISSION'S WORK
The editors have included in this selection of Commission
studies the paper prepared by the consultant on constitutional
issues, Professor Peter Shane.'
Working within the framework of
current interpretative approaches to the Constitution, but not
enslaved by any of them, Professor Shane provided a thoughtful and
balanced analysis of the major constitutional questions. Of the
various constitutional issues that Professor Shane addressed, the
most important by far for the Commission's work was whether the
impeachment process is the exclusive constitutionally permissible
means to remove an Article III judge from office.
If the Constitution would permit a statutory removal mechanism, proposals for creation of such a mechanism 45 would avoid
a serious practical and political obstacle: the necessity of a constitutional amendment.
The Commission was aware of statutory
proposals for dealing with cases involving federal judges previously
convicted of serious crime. It also knew that statutory removal had
adherents who believed that the impeachment process is simply too
cumbersome for all but the most important federal officers. If, on
the other hand, removal from office by means other than impeachment were unconstitutional, adding an alternative removal mechanism would involve the costs, including the risks and uncertainties,
46
of a constitutional amendment.
In concluding that the impeachment process is the exclusive
mechanism for the political branches to remove an Article III judge
that is consistent with the Constitution, Professor Shane relied on
the language of that document, its contemporaneous interpretation

44 See Peter M. Shane, Who May DisciplineorRemoveFederalJudgesA Constitutional
Analysis, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1993). An earlier version of the author's research
paper is published in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 42, at 1.
5 For a brief description of some of the statutory removal mechanisms that have
been proposed, see REPORT, supra note 2, at 157-61.
46 For a description of some of those costs, see id. at 6-7; Burbank, supra note 8,
at 648-49.
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by the framers and ratifiers, and on certain structural considerations. 47 Although he deemed discipline through judicial self48
regulation an issue requiring a different interpretative approach,
he reasoned that the explicit textual attention to removal might well
be found to set "categorical limits to those sanctions that might be
imposed through other means." 49 In addressing both aspects of
the removal question, Professor Shane had the benefit of one of two
Commission studies 5 ° of a 1790 bribery statute, 5 1 a statute that
has often been cited in support of the constitutionality of removal
by means other than impeachment. 52 Those studies strongly
suggest that the 1790 statute should not be read to effect a removal
from current office (as opposed to disqualification from holding
future office) and, moreover, that it would not be so read by the
53
Supreme Court.
In turn, the Commission's conclusion that removal of federal
judges "by means other than impeachment and conviction would be
unconstitutional" 54 was influenced not only by Professor Shane's
cogent analysis and the work done on the 1790 statute, but also by
the discussion and debate of Professor Shane's draft report by
nationally recognized authorities in the field at a roundtable
sponsored by the Commission. 5 5 In addition, in response to the
work of the Commission, the American Bar Association undertook
a reexamination of its previous support for a statutory removal
mechanism. 5 6 The ABA's Task Force on Judicial Removal concluded that the previous support had either ignored or paid inadequate
47 See Shane, supra note 44, at 105-14.
48 See id. at 115-16.
41 Id. at 131.
5
o See id. at 121 n.64 (citing Elizabeth B. Bazan, Disqualificationof FederalJudges
Convicted of Bribery-An Examination of the Act of April 30, 1790 and Related Issues, in
2 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 42, at 1285, 1307).
"' See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. IX, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (1988)). The 1790 Act provided that a federaljudge convicted of
taking a bribe could be imprisoned and "disqualified to hold any office of honour,
trust or profit under the United States." Id.
52 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The ConstitutionalLimits to Impeachment and its
Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1, 68-69 (1989); Shane, supra note 44, at 120.
53 See Bazan, supra note 50;Jerome M. Marcus, The 1790 Statute and Control of a
Judge's Tenure in Office, in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 42, at 1321; Shane, supra
note 44, at 120 n.64; see also Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906) (finding
that a similarly worded statute did not automatically require removal of a senator).
54 REPORT, supra note 2, at 20.
55 See id. at iv.
56 See Task Force on Judicial Removal, American Bar Assoc., Report of the
American Bar Association Task Force on judicial Removal 2 (Feb. 1993) (on file with
authors).
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attention to the constitutional issues, which it regarded as very
serious, and recommended a reversal of the previous position. The
ABA's House of Delegates accepted the Task Force's recommendation; the official position of the Association does not now support
57
changes in the removal mechanism by statutory enactment.
As noted above, the Commission recognized the importance of
the question of the constitutionality of the Senate's use of a
committee to gather evidence in an impeachment trial. The
authority for that mode of proceeding dated to an amendment to
the Senate Rules in 1935, but the new rule, Rule XI, was not used
until the impeachment trial of Harry Claiborne in 1986, when Rule
XI was also amended. It was used again for the impeachment trials
of Alcee Hastings and Walter Nixon. 58
On each occasion, the
constitutionality and fairness of taking evidence before twelve
senators under Rule XI was challenged in the Senate, and the
challenges were renewed in federal court.59 Soon after the Commission began work, the Supreme Court granted Nixon's petition
for certiorari to consider whether the Senate's use of Rule XI was
60
justiciable and, if so, whether it was constitutional.
Rule XI represents one of the few changes in the Senate's Rules
since they were initially formulated for the impeachment trial of
President AndrewJohnson in 1868.61 It was avowedly intended to
enable the Senate to conduct impeachment trials more efficiently
and also, it was hoped, more fairly. 62 The half century that passed
before it was first employed only increased concerns about the
burdens of impeachment trials on the Senate. 63 Furthermore, the
perceived burdens of the three impeachment trials that had the

57 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 20 (noting the Association found that "'no
significant benefit would be realized by adding statutory removal from office to the
methods of discipline under the [1980] Act, especially in light of the serious
constitutional question whether article IIIjudges may be removed by means other
than impeachment'") (quotingJudicialDisciplineand Removal, Policy Statement of the
American Bar Association (adopted Feb. 1993)).
58 See id. at 50-51.
59 See Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 500 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated and
remanded, 1993 WL 81273, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 1993), dismissed, 1993 WL 439810,
at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 1993); Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C.
1991), af'd, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir.), af'd, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
60 See supra text accompanying note 43. The Court acted on February 24, 1992,
approximately one month after the Commission's first meeting.
61 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 49-50; supra text accompanying note 18.
62 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
63 See id. at 50-51.
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benefit of Rule XI committees were a major factor in the Commis64
sion's creation.
If the Supreme Court were to hold the constitutional question
in Nixon justiciable and to hold further that the Senate could not
constitutionally take evidence through a committee, the implications
for the Commission's work would be momentous. Not only would
the full Senate be required to take evidence, such a holding would
cast doubt on the viability of other possible changes in the Senate's
(and the House's) rules and practices to make impeachment trials
more efficient. As a result, the case for alternative removal
mechanisms, even if requiring a constitutional amendment, would
be measurably strengthened.
The Commission, therefore, thought it very important to have
the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon before making
its final findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Given the
Court's schedule of arguments and the time usually required for
decision, that seemed unlikely in light of the statutory requirement
that the Commission submit its report within a year after it began
work. 65 This was an additional, and very powerful, argument for
the Commission to seek an extension of that date, which was secured.66 In the meantime and in order not to delay its work, the
Commission operated on the assumption that the Court either
would affirm the court of appeals' ruling that the issue was not
justiciable 67 or would sustain the constitutionality of Rule XI.
That assumption permitted the Commission to consider additional
changes in congressional rules and practices 68 and a strategy for
reform that could be compared to reform by means of constitutional amendment. The wisdom of proceeding in this manner was
6 See id. at i-iii, 4-5.
65 The statute creating the Commission required that it submit its report "not
later than one year after the date of its first meeting." National Commission on

Judicial Discipline and Removal Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 415, 104 Stat. 5124,5127
(1990). The Commission's first meeting was held in January 1992. See supra text
accompanying notes 30-33.

66 See supra text accompanying note 32.

67 See Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct.
732 6(1993).
8 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 37-49, 53-60. Among the more important of the
changes recommended is that the "Senate apply issue preclusion to matters
necessarily determined against a judge in a prior criminal trial except in unusual
circumstances." Id. at 59. The Commission took seriously the independent duty of
Senators and Representatives to interpret and apply the Constitution. See id. at 11.
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confirmed when the Court, in January 1993, held that the issue was
69
not justiciable.
The answers to these two questions of law-whether impeachment is the only valid mechanism for removal from office, and the
scope of Congress's power to control impeachment proceedingswere critical to the Commission's work because they profoundly
affected both the size and shape of the landscape available for
reform under existing constitutional arrangements.
The Commission's conclusion, consistent with Professor Shane's
study, that the impeachment process is the exclusive means to
remove an Article IIIjudge from office, coupled with the lesson of
Nixon that most aspects of impeachment proceedings are beyond
judicial review, strongly suggested that the best strategy for reform
of the discipline and removal system was to make existing arrangements more efficient, with due regard to the rights and interests,
including the independence, of thejudge. In the end, the Commission preferred that strategy to the uncertainties and risks attendant
upon attempts to replace existing arrangements by constitutional
amendment.
IV. THE ROLE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN
THE COMMISSION'S WORK

In preparing its work plan, the Commission was aware that,
although there was an extensive literature on the constitutional
issues relating to federal judicial discipline, little was known about
many other matters important to its work. These matters included
the practices and procedures of the House and Senate, from the
initial responses to complaints through formal impeachment
proceedings, and the administration of the 1980 Act by the federal
judiciary. The Commission was also aware that the dearth of
inquiry on such matters extended to empirical investigation of the
system of federal judicial discipline in all its forms.
The lack of useful information concerning many problems and
issues of federal judicial discipline was sufficient reason for the
Commission to consider the potential and limitations of empirical
work under its auspices. It was not the only reason, however. At
least one of the proposals for reform before the Commission's
creation was explained by resort to demonstrably erroneous factual
69

See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 732.
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70
assertions concerning the administration of the 1980 Act.
Moreover, apart from the value of empirical investigation in casting
light on the operation of the existing mechanisms, it seemed
important for a body that had been created to advise policymakers
to have a good sense of the views of those affected by the relevant
71
issues.
In considering with its consultants the scope and nature of the
research to be undertaken, the Commission confronted two
especially difficult problems in addition to those inherent in the
enterprise. First, the time available for the preparation and
administration of suitable protocols and instruments and for the
evaluation of research results was very short. Decisions about
research had to be made when it was not clear that the Commission
would secure an extension of time to file its final report; even with
the extension, completing the research in time to make it useful to
the Commission was a daunting challenge. Second, a number of
areas of interest to the Commission might not in fact be capable of
empirical study because critical information relating to them might
be treated as confidential by its custodians, whether or not such
treatment was required by law.
The Commission approached problems of confidentiality with
respect for the interests of the three branches and of individuals but
with determination to seek appropriate compromises that would
permit pursuit of these important lines of inquiry. In those
instances in which access proved impossible in the time available
and the issue was deemed important, the Commission made
recommendations for study by an entity with access to the confidential information. 72 Fortunately, in those areas most critical to the
Commission's work, compromise was reached on access to the
confidential information needed, enabling its consultants for the
first time rigorously to evaluate the experience under the 1980
73

Act.

70 See Burbank, supra note 8, at 660.

7, For a description of the questionnaires prepared by Commission consultants
for this purpose, see REPORT, supra note 2, at 140.
72 See, e.g., id. at 63 ("The Commission recommends that the Senate review its
confirmation proceedings involving judges prosecuted since 1980 to determine
whether those proceedings were thorough and whether they revealed any problems
suggesting a danger of misconduct by the nominees. The Senate review should be
forward-looking, designed to avoid problems in the future."); see also id. at 82
(encouraging similar executive branch review); Burbank, supra note 8, at 658-59
(suggesting such inquiries).
'-' See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
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The serious time limitations required that the Commission and
its consultants design empirical research with appropriate limits on
scope and breadth. Even so, the Commission successfully employed
an array of types of empirical research, often bringing multiple
methods to bear on a single issue or set of issues.74 The editors
of the Law Review have included in this collection of Commission
studies two articles that give a good sense both of the techniques of
empirical research employed by the Commission's consultants and
of the impact of that research on its findings, conclusions, and
recommendations.
Working under the auspices of the Commission and the Federal
Judicial Center, Jeffrey Barr and Thomas Willging conducted the
first rigorous study of experience under the 1980 Act ever undertaken. 75 As a result of the patient efforts of Judge Levin Campbell,
a member of the Commission, and with the assistance of Judge
William Schwarzer, the Director of the Center, Barr and Willging
were given access to the complaints filed in the eight circuits
included in their sample, as well as to the orders and any accompanying memoranda disposing of those complaints. 76 In addition,
Barr and Willging had available all of the national statistical
information compiled pursuant to the Act, and they conducted
detailed interviews with circuit chief judges and others involved in
the Act's administration.
Recognizing that the effectiveness of the 1980 Act had been a
matter of controversy, the Commission employed another consultant, Professor Richard Marcus, to work cooperatively with Barr and
Willging but to draw his own conclusions. 77 The confidence with
which the Commission made findings, conclusions, and recommendations about the 1980 Act was attributable in large part to the high
level of agreement among its consultants concerning both the
achievements and the problems of the 1980 Act.

74 For a discussion of the use of multiple methods of research and their advantage
over single methods, see Ilene Nagel et al., Methodological Issues in Court Research:
PretrialRelease Decisionsfor FederalDefendants, 11 Soc. METHODS & RES. 469 (1983).
75 See Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized Self-Regulation,
Accountability, andjudicialIndependenceUndertheFederaIjudicialConductandDisability
Act of 1980, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1993). An earlier version of the authors' research
paper is published in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 42, at 477.
76 See Barr & Willging, supra note 75, at 31.
77 See Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Regulate FederalJudges, and How?, in 1

supra note 42, at 363. Professor Marcus's paper has also been
published at 149 F.R.D. 375 (1993).
RESEARCH PAPERS,
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One of the most interesting aspects of the Barr and Willging
research was the suggested causal connection between the problematic dismissals identified in the sample and the practices of chief
judges both in employing qualified staff assistance and in preparing
orders and accompanying memoranda. 78 This information directly
79
contributed to two of the Commission's recommendations.
The other example of the Commission's empirical work that the
editors have included in the articles published here is a study by
Professor Charles Geyh.8 0 Professor Geyh had a difficult assignment but also one of the most important. The success of informal
disciplinary mechanisms had been touted before the 1980 Act was
passed, and its sponsors expected them to continue to play a major
role even after a formal complaint procedure was in place. 8 ' Yet,
defining the universe of informal mechanisms, let alone evaluating
their effectiveness, is no easy task. Professor Geyh took a broad
view of "judicial discipline," including in the category of informal
82
approaches everything from peer pressure to appellate review.
For the purpose of evaluation, the possibilities for empirical
investigation of many of these approaches were limited, because, as
83
one chief judge observed, "you don't keep score."
Working in collaboration with the Commission's consultants on
the operation of the 1980 Act, Professor Geyh devised a questionnaire for present and former chief judges.84 The responses to the
questionnaire, it was hoped, would provide useful information
about, among other things, the frequency and perceived comparative effectiveness of the various mechanisms for informal discipline.
Based in part on those responses, Professor Geyh's analysis proved
important to the Commission's findings and conclusions about the
current importance of informal approaches to discipline and the
impact of the 1980 Act on informal resolutions.85 Those findings
78 See Barr & Willging, supra note 75, at 40-42, 160-61.

7 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 103 (recommending, among other things, that
"chief judges seek assistance from qualified staff in reviewing complaints and

preparing orders"); id. at 108-09 (recommending preparation of nonconclusory
supporting memoranda for dispositions dismissing complaints or concluding
proceedings on the basis of corrective action taken).
80 See Charles G. Geyh, Informal Methods ofJudicial Discipline,142 U. PA. L. REV.
243 (1993). An earlier version of the author's research paper is published in 1
RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 42, at 713.
81 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 113.
82 See Geyh, supra note 80, at 246-47.

83 REPORT, supra note 2, at 113.
84 The questionnaire is reprinted in Geyh, supra note 80, app.

85 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 6, 113-21, 123-24 (discussing informal approaches
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and conclusions, in turn, were critical to the Commission's
conclusion that a significant cost of a centralized disciplinary system
for the federal judiciary, such as had been recommended on state
models, would be the loss of effectiveness of informal approaches
86
to misconduct and disability.
Taken as a whole, the studies of the operation of the 1980 Act
persuaded the Commission that Congress's goals are being well
served but that there is room for improvement.8 7 Those studies
also uncovered many of the areas in which the Commission
concluded that such improvements might profitably be made.
Moreover, together with the work done on informal approaches to
discipline, the Commission's research on the 1980 Act provided a
firm factual foundation for the conclusion that improvements in the
existing system would be preferable to adoption of a wholly
different system, whether by statute or by constitutional amend88
ment.
The Commission's studies of experience under existing formal
and informal mechanisms did not, however, answer the question
whether some number of meritorious complaints never enter the
system. For that, it relied on surveys conducted by the Justice
Research Institute8 9 and other information available through
testimony and interviews. These sources persuaded the Commission
that fear of retaliation prevents some lawyers and litigants, particularly repeat players, from filing complaints under the 1980 Act.
Moreover, the surveys demonstrated that there is a disturbing level
of ignorance about the Act among virtually every group surveyed.
These findings led the Commission to recommend that additional
steps be taken to educate lawyers, judges, court personnel, and
members of the public about the 1980 Act, and that mechanisms be

to discipline within the judiciary).
86 See id. at 124. The other major cost of a central enforcement authority that
concerned the Commission related to judicial independence. See id.
87 See id. at 6-7, 123-24.
88 See id. at 6-7, 22-25, 123-24. Professor Lempert states: "The fact that a decision
would be the same without the research that legitimates it, does not.., mean that
the decision would have been the same had the research results been different."
Richard Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip': Social Science Influences on Law and Policy,
10 LAW & POL'Y 167, 197 n.12 (1988).
89 See William K. Slate, II, Analysis andReport: Surveys of Knowledge and Satisfaction
of FederalJudicial Discipline and Removal Mechanisms and Processes, in 2 RESEARCH
PAPERS, supra note 42, at 959, 1021 ("Though a majority ofjudges profess satisfaction
with the presentjudicial complaint system, there is an acknowledgement on the part
ofjudges (and attorneys and clerks as well) that valid complaints are not ied.").
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established to assist in presenting serious complaints to chiefjudges
90
without fear of retaliation.
In sum, although the empirical research conducted under the
Commission's auspices was, of necessity, constrained by the time
available, the number and variety of methods employed were
impressive and the impact of the research results on the Commission's findings, conclusions, and recommendations was pervasive.
V. THE ROLE OF HISTORIcAL RESEARCH IN
THE COMMISSION'S WORK

In considering social science methodologies that might advance
its search for understanding of the processes and practices of
federal judicial discipline and socialization, the Commission
recognized that an important dimension of understanding can be
provided by historical research, particularly research that seeks data
similar to those available through other forms of empirical research,
and from which policy judgments can be made.
One of the troubling questions confronting the Commission
concerned the causes for and implications of the current spate of
impeachments of sitting federal judges.
Specifically, was this
evidence of a general decline in judicial ethics and behavior perhaps
mirroring what many see as a general deterioration of public
morals? Should we expect a continuation of a pattern of prosecutions of judges and a concomitant need for removal by impeachment? Uncomfortable questions about which to speculate; difficult
questions for which to find answers.
The Commission sought perspective from history. Familiar were
the tales of the handful of judges whose public disgrace was
recorded in the pages of congressional records. 9 1 Less familiar
but nonetheless a part of the lore were the cases of certain judges
caught in the meshes of their own misconduct, but who escaped
impeachment by resigning. 92 Missing was a full historical account
of why federal judges have left the bench, and especially the
circumstances of premature resignations. Knowledge of this sort
might provide insight into whether the recent prosecutions and
impeachments were symptoms of an alarming change in judicial
90 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 99-102.
91 See id. at 29-30.

92 See Burbank, supra note 8, at 653-54.
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behavior, or an unfortunate coalescence of essentially random but
statistically predictable events.
The editors have included the historical study completed for the
Commission by Professor Emily Field Van Tassel, 93 who was
serving at the time as Associate Historian with the Federal Judicial
History Office of the Federal Judicial Center. Professor Van Tassel
used as the central focus of her study the 190 judges who, over the
last 200 years, resigned from the bench for stated reasons other
than age or health. She employed various sources, basing her
conclusions on aggregated data as well as on the actions and claims
of individual judges. Her study and its conclusions were important
aids to the Commission in assessing the causes for the recent
troubling events, and the likelihood of them being repeated. The
Commission, viewing these events in their historical context, was
better able to make recommendations regarding the relationship of
prosecution to removal, 94 the importance of close cooperation
between prosecutors and Congress, 95 and the motivations that
would lead a judge under current circumstances to prefer a public
96
impeachment over a quietly negotiated resignation.
Professor Van Tassel's study is also an example of research that,
although conducted for the purposes of the Commission, has
implications for policy questions, or other potential uses, unrelated
to federal judicial discipline. Thus, her work casts light on the
extent to which financial considerations have influenced resigna97
tions, both recently and over time.

93 See Emily F. Van Tassel, Resignationsand Removals: A History of FederalJudicial
Service-and Disservice-1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 333 (1993). An earlier version
of the author's research paper is published in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 42, at

1137.
94 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-79.
95 See id. at 79-81.
96 See id. at 76-77 (sentencing policy), 114-18 (employment benefits).
97 See Van Tassel, supra note 93, at 355-64. It is not the only such example,
however. Note also the work of Professor Dan McGill, a Commission consultant,
whose lucid exposition and analysis of the pension and other (noncompensation)
benefits of federal judges may be the first understandable account of such matters
ever written. It should be read byjudges and policymakers alike. See Dan M. McGill,
Disincentives to Resignation of DisciplinedFederalJudges in the Benefits Package of the
FederalJudiciary,in 2 RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 42, at 1221.

FOREWORD
CONCLUSION

Professor Richard Lempert has advanced the hypothesis that
both the use of social science research in legal decision-making and
the form of such use largely depend on three considerations:
(1) the type of user (i.e., legislature, agency, or court); (2) the type
of research (i.e., synthesis of extant research or original study); and
(3) research-user interaction (i.e., commissioned or freelance research). 98 We believe that the work of the National Commission
sheds additional light on the issue explored by Professor Lempert:
"[H]ow the influence of social science scholarship on legal activity
reflects the characteristics of both the research available for
utilization and the legal institutions that are its potential consum99
ers."
In supporting his hypothesis Professor Lempert observed that,
whereas legislatures are more likely to commission research
syntheses than specific research projects, the opposite is true of
administrative agencies.10 0 He observed further that "[c]ommissioned research is likely to be used, if it is used at all, only by the
agency that commissioned it."10 1 Noting both a widely shared
opinion that social science research is not used to any appreciable
extent by policymakers and substantial evidence to the contrary,
Professor Lempert sought a reconciliation in the notion of
"use." 10 2 Thus, those who believe that policymakers do not use
social science make demands that are, he argues, rarely realistic or
wise, expecting a directly traceable influence of research results on
a decision. Such expectations fail to account for "the range of
98

See Lempert, supra note 88, at 167-69.

99 Id. at 168. Lempert continues:
Understanding how governmental agencies, be they administrative agencies,

legislatures or courts, come to use information of all kinds and learning how they
use different kinds of information in their decision making tasks, is crucial to
understanding how laws are generated and have their effects. Also the
suggestion that references to social science may have a legitimating function
touches on another core socio-legal concern. Thus, the question of how law and
social science research and other social science research is used is itself a law and
social science question.

Id. at 195.
'00 See id. at 172 ("Legislatures seek syntheses more often than studies, but among
the operating agencies the pattern is different.").
10 Id. at 177.
102 See id. at 179-81 ("The most promising way of effecting such a reconciliation

focuses on what different people mean by the word 'use.'").
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considerations that properly affect governmental decisions " 103 or
for the fact that decisions rarely issue from a "single authoritative
decision maker."10 4 Social science is used, and more often has
impact, in "shap[ing] the terms in which policy-making proceeds,
often without the decision maker knowing it," performing what
10 5
Professor Lempert calls "a conceptual or enlightenment"
function.
The National Commission did not have the power to make any
legally binding decisions, and in that sense it does not fit within
Professor Lempert's typology of users. It was, however, a governmental agency directed by statute to make policy recommendations
that, from the perspective of Commission members, were the
functional equivalent of agency decisions. At least some of these
10 6
recommendations are likely to generate new law.
To the extent that the Commission is like an administrative
agency for this purpose, its extensive use of social science research
is not surprising. The Commission was atypical in this respect only
because adjudicatory procedure was a major focus of its efforts, and
decisions about adjudicatory procedure are not often made with the
benefit of social science research.
Particularly in recent years, the lawmaking structure and
procedures that result in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
resembled the administrative process, but there is little evidence of
use of social science research, synthetic or original, for either
10 7
instrumental or enlightenment purposes in that process.

'03

Id. at 182-83.

Id. at 183 ("[T]his image of the single authoritative decision maker is almost
as misleading as the image of the unambiguous, authoritative study.").
.05 Id. at 183 (citations omitted).
106 Congress's creation of the Commission and its direction that the Commission
"investigate and study" federal judicial discipline illustrate another role of social
science discussed by Professor Lempert:
[S]ocial science may serve as a substitute for decision-makingin that instead
of resolving a difficult problem, a policy-maker may decide simply to study
it further-perhaps hoping that pressures to resolve the problem or to
resolve it in a particular direction will go away-which sometimes happens.
Lempert, supra note 88, at 184; see also supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
107 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and ProceduralLaw Reform: A Callfor
a Moratorium,59 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform of FederalCivilRulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 487 (1993) ("The
Civil Rules were amended ... at least eighteen different times between 1939 and
1991, and my review of that amendment process reveals only one or two instances
when the Committee abandoned the rationalistic approach and sought an empirical
predicate for decision." (footnote omitted)).
104
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Among the factors affecting use discussed by Professor Lempert,
one that may help to explain this phenomenon is "the costs (often
in time) of acquiring research."1 08 In addition to the structural
characteristics he mentions, one might add professional predisposition (or absence thereof) to social science research10 9 and the
perceived potential impact of uncongenial findings on the discre110
tion, and hence the power, of decision-makers.
What might be thought surprising is the extent to which the
Commission made direct use of research findings. In fact, however,
the Commission's experience supports Professor Lempert's
hypothesis, because the research in question was commissioned, and
it was original research conducted with specific information needs
in mind, the potential relevance of which had been identified in
advance.

111

In remarking the Commission's direct use of social science
research results, we do not mean to undervalue the enlightenment
function that consultants' studies served in informing its deliberations. Moreover, it is important to stress that, as we have pointed
out, many of those studies contain information that is relevant, both
directly and conceptually, to public policy in areas other than
112
federal judicial discipline.
Professor Lempert qualified his observation about the limited
use of commissioned research, quoted above,113 by suggesting
"that it is possible for a commissioned study to be so publicized that
it diffuses in much the same way as influential freelance research

Lempert, supra note 88, at 185.
Lawyers (including academic lawyers) generally have little training in or
exposure to social science research. Still relatively few law schools around the
country have any significant number of faculty members with professional credentials
in social science disciplines. This situation may change as schools incorporate in the
basic curriculum courses or training in law and social science methodology. Cf.
Stephen B. Burbank, Introduction: Plus ga Change...?". 21 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 509,51213 (1988) (observing barriers to empirical work by legal academics). For examples
of the use of social science research in several other legal contexts, see Ilene Nagel
et al., The Institutionof the PrivateAttorney Generak Perspectivesfrom an EmpiricalStudy
of ClassAction Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1988); Ilene Nagel et al., Empirical
108
109

Research and the ShareholderDerivative Suit: Toward a Better-Informed Debate, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 137; S.Jay Plager, The Spouse's NonbarrableShare:
A Solution in Search of a Problem, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 681 (1966).

110 See Burbank, supra note 107.
...See Lempert, supra note 88, at 169-70, 177-78, 179-83.
112 See supra text accompanying note 97.
113 See supra text accompanying note 101.
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does." 114 The articles in this issue of the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review represent some of the best work done for the National
Commission on judicial Discipline and Removal. Their publication
here, as well as in the official papers of the Commission, gives us
hope that they will have the influence they deserve.

114

Lempert, supra note 88, at 196 n.8.

